Abstract. We define and discuss Savage games, which are ordinal games that are set in L. J. Savage's framework of purely subjective uncertainty. Every Bayesian game is ordinally equivalent to a Savage game. However, Savage games are free of priors, probabilities and payoffs. Players' information and subjective attitudes toward uncertainty are encoded in the state-dependent preferences over state contingent action profiles. In the games we study player preferences satisfy versions of Savage's sure thing principle and small event continuity postulate. An axiomatic innovation is a strategic analog of Savage's null events. We prove the existence of equilibrium in Savage games. This result eschews any notion of objective randomization, convexity, and monotonicity. Applying it to games with payoffs we show that our assumptions are satisfied by a wide range of decision-theoretic models. In this regard, Savage games afford a tractable framework to study attitudes towards uncertainty in a strategic setting. We illustrate our results on the existence of equilibrium by means of examples of games in which players have expected and non-expected utility.
Introduction
Consider the N -player Bayesian game
, where (Ω i , Σ i ) is the measurable space of Player i's types and A i is a compact metric space of Player i's actions. Player i has a bounded measurable payoff function
where A = × j A j is the set of action profiles and Ω = × j Ω j is the space of type profiles. Letting F j be the set of all measurable strategies f j : Ω j → A j of Player j, Player i's expected utility for the strategy profile f in F = × j F j is
where π is the probability measure on type profiles representing the players' common prior.
This induces for Player i a preference relation ≿ i on the set of strategy profiles F , whereby f ≿ i g whenever U i (f ) ≥ U i (g). The triple, (Ω, A, ≿ i ), can in turn be articulated in terms of Savage's (1954) framework of purely subjective uncertainty. The set of type profiles Ω is Savage's state space; the set of action profiles A plays the role of Savage's outcome space; and preferences ≿ i are restricted to those Savage acts f : Ω → A that are strategy profiles.
Our interest is to study N -player games specified by (Ω, A, (
where Ω is the common state space and A is the common action space. For Player i, F i is a given subset of A-valued functions on Ω comprising those strategies available to that player and ≿ i is a preference relation defined over strategy profiles in F = × j F j . We call these Savage games. They redact all cardinal aspects of Bayesian games (utilities and priors), the intrinsic attitudes towards uncertainty are purely subjective, and the common state and action spaces need not be Cartesian products of underlying individual state and action spaces. An equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the N -player ordinal game (F i , ≿ i ) N i=1 . We study three behavioral properties that are inherited from Bayesian games.
(a) Any deviation by a player from one best response to another conditional on an event remains a best response. This version of Savage's sure thing principle holds in all Bayesian games. (b) If a deviation by Player i affects Player j's preferences, then the effect on j is robust to Player i making "errors" that are conditioned on the small events specified by some partition of the state space. This interdependent version of Savage's small event continuity postulate is satisfied in a continuous Bayesian game with a common prior that has atomless marginals. (c) Analogously to Savage's null events, we say that an event is strategically null for Player i if any deviation on that event by the player does not affect any players' preferences. Events that are not null are "full" in a behavioral sense: for every sequence of events that has no subsequence decreasing to a null event there is a state whose average incidence is asymptotically bounded away from zero. In a Bayesian game with common priors every zero probability event is a strategically null event; hence, this property is satisfied. With the following additional condition we prove the existence of equilibrium and in the process develop a theory of equilibrium existence that is derived entirely from the ordinal preferences of the players.
(d) Players have the opportunity to respond to other players using strategies that are in an equicontinuous class of functions. In a Bayesian game, this is satisfied when one can always find a best response with bounded marginal change in chosen actions with respect to own types. Turning to games with payoffs, we study properties (a), (b), and (c) when the ex ante evaluation of strategy profiles can be expressed as a recursive function of interim utilities. We show that a wide range of properties studied in the literature satisfy our assumptions. The analysis includes games in which players' ex ante utilities are of the maxmin expected utility form of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) if the following three conditions hold.
(1) Payoffs are continuous in action profiles.
(2) There is a measure with atomless marginals that dominates the multiple priors of all players. (3) The preferences admit a utility representation in the recursive form of Epstein and Schneider (2003) and for each player the multiple priors are mutually absolutely continuous (cf. Epstein and Marinacci (2007) ). Here an application of our existence theorem simply requires us to check condition (d). We illustrate this by establishing the existence of equilibrium in two versions of a location model on the n-sphere. The first is a Bayesian game in which each player has her own (not necessarily common) prior and the second is a game with multiple priors for each player. In these examples players simultaneously choose locations on an n-dimensional unit sphere and have payoff functions that depend in a general way on the location choices and types of all players. We establish that property (d) holds by constructing a parametrization of strategies using a selection theorem for closed-valued Lipschitz continuous correspondences.
The theorem on the existence of equilibrium develops techniques and utilizes a new fixed point theorem in non-linear analysis (for this, see the discussion following Theorem 2.8 and Theorem A.4.) Our techniques extend the concepts in Athey (2001) , McAdams (2003) and Reny (2011) , who proved the existence of monotone equilibrium in Bayesian games with continuous lattice-ordered action spaces and atomless type spaces. The recent paper of Reny (2011) provides the most refined argument, he uses a homotopy method to trace decomposition paths in the sub-semilattices of monotone best responses. The present work frees these techniques from any order-theoretic requirement and extends the approach well beyond Bayesian games. The key idea is that the set of strategies and the sets of best responses are decomposable in the sense of Rockafellar (1968 Rockafellar ( , 1971 and related literature on non-linear analysis. This decomposable choice property was studied in a decision-making framework by Grant, Kajii, and Polak (2000) , who applied their own tracing arguments. By means of conditional deviations, in this paper we can continuously pass from one best response to another without leaving the set of best responses. This property, which is a consequence of our sure thing principle, our small event continuity, and the "fullness" property of non-null sets (respectively, (a), (b), (c) above) allows us to apply path following arguments without any convexity assumption, or any meaningful notion of monotonicity. Assumption (d) ensures that we have the required compactness property to establish the existence of equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe and study Savage games and state our main theorem. In Section 3 we study games with recursive payoffs and priors. We highlight in this section how our assumptions and the result on the existence of equilibrium translate to Bayesian games, games with multiple priors and games in which preferences display other forms of non-expected utility. Section 4 focuses specifically on preferences that have the maxmin expected utility representation. Section 5 contains the two examples. We conclude with a discussion of open questions and possible extensions of this work in Section 6. The proofs are in Appendix A.
Savage games
A Savage game is an N -player ordinal game modeling choice under uncertainty with interdependent preferences. It is specified by the ternion
The set Ω denotes the common state space and A is the common nonempty action set endowed with a topology in which single points are closed. The tuple
is an N -player ordinal game whose parameters are described below.
There are N ≥ 1 players indexed by i = 1, . . . , N . We abuse notation by having N also denote the set {1, . . . , N }. However, we employ standard notation for the indexing of player profiles. In particular, for any N -tuple (Z i ) N i=1 of sets we write Z for its N -ary Cartesian product and for each player i we write Z −i for the Cartesian product of the tuple (Z j ) j̸ =i . Vectors in Z are called profiles and vectors in Z −i are called profiles of players other than i. A profile z ∈ Z is also written as (z i , z −i ) where z i is the i-th coordinate of z and z −i is the projection of z into Z −i .
Player i has a non-empty set F i of A-valued functions on the state space Ω called the strategy space. A function f i : Ω → A in F i is called a strategy for player i. Let F be the set of strategy profiles and for each i let F −i be the set of strategy profiles of players other than i.
Player i is also associated with a preordering ≿ i on the set of strategy profiles F describing her weak preferences. That is, ≿ i is transitive and reflexive. Let ∼ i represent the indifference relation associated with ≿ i , that is f ∼ i g if f ≿ i g and g ≿ i f . We assume throughout that the following completeness condition is satisfied.
for all g i ∈ F i and i ∈ N . Under A1 f ∈ F is an equilibrium if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of the ordinal game
. In a Savage game the information available to a player is encoded in the specification of the set of strategies F i . Following standard notation, for any subset E ⊆ Ω and two functions f i , g i : Ω → A let g iE f i be the function from Ω to A given by
We refer to the function g iE f i as the g i -deviation from f i conditional on E.
Information events. A set of states E ⊆ Ω is an (information) event for Player i if she can condition her choice of strategy on E, that is,
Denote by F i the family of events for Player i.
The next assumption is motivated by Savage's sure thing principle. We shall omit the quantifiers from our assumptions when they are obvious. In particular, f is understood as an arbitrary member of F , f i and g i of F i , and E always denotes an event in F i .
The reader will see in Section 3 that in games in which the preferences are given by payoffs A2 holds when any of a wide range of assumptions that have been studied in the literature are satisfied. In particular, A2 is implied by Savage's postulate P2.
Proposition 2.1. The following condition implies A2
We do not assume that the game contains constant strategies or that it is non-degenerate in the sense of Savage. We make, however, the following "richness" assumption on strategies.
Proposition 2.2. F i is an algebra over Ω. If A3 holds, then it is a σ-algebra.
When a measure-theoretic framework is available we have the following. Corollary 2.3. Let Σ i be a σ-algebra over Ω and A be a compact metric space, with |A| ≥ 2. If F i is the set of all Σ i -measurable functions to A, then A3 holds and F i = Σ i .
We extend the concept of a Savage null event to our setting of interdependent preferences. An event will be deemed (Savage) null for a player if any deviation that player can make conditional on that event from any strategy profile leaves all players indifferent.
Denote by N i the set of all events that are null for Player i. Let R i = F i \ N i be the set of relevant events for Player i.
Notice that two players i, j ∈ N may share an event E ∈ F i ∩ F j that is null for Player i but relevant for Player j. We do not view this as anomalous or inconsistent. It simply means that when conditioning on this event, no deviation by Player i can make anyone better or worse off, however, there exists at least one deviation by Player j that makes at least one player in the game either better or worse off. Karni, Schmeidler, and Vind (1983) note that if preferences are state-dependent, then interpreting null events as ones that are necessarily viewed by the decision-maker as having zero probability of occurring is problematic. For example, if one of the events involves loss of life then its nullity could reflect the decision-maker having no strict preference about which outcome obtains in the event she is dead, rather than her believing she has no chance of dying.
We turn now to the continuity of preferences. While the product topology is too coarse to be useful for our purpose, a fine topology that is closely related to metric spaces is the sequential topology, whereby a set W of functions from Ω to A is open if every sequence of functions converging state-wise to a function in W is eventually in W .
2 We require continuity of preferences in the sequential topology, and note that the condition is satisfied in continuous games in which utility is computed by means of integrals.
A4. If f n ∈ F and g n i ∈ F i are two sequences converging state-wise to f ∈ F and g i ∈ F i , respectively, and
The set of null events for Player i is automatically an ideal, and assumption A4 guarantees that it is a σ-ideal.
Proposition 2.4. N i is an ideal in F i . If A3 and A4 hold for all players, then N i is a σ-ideal.
The next assumption is a "fullness" assumption on relevant events. It adapts the RyllNardzewski and Kelley condition for Boolean algebras to our setting (see the addendum to Kelley (1959) ). A family of events S ⊆ F i is closed if for any increasing sequence of events E n in S whose union E is an event, we have E ∈ S.
A5. There is a sequence of closed families S m i of events satisfying:
is a sequence of relevant events for Player i and
then for each m there is n such that E n ∈ S m i . Interpreting the sequence S m i as families of small events forming a neighborhood base for the subfamily of null sets in condition (1), condition (2) asserts that if the average incidences arising from the sequence E n uniformly converges to zero for all states, then E n has a subsequence that "converges" to a null event. Condition (2) guarantees that for each S m i there is a number c m > 0 such that if X n is a sequence of random variables and for some α ∈ R the sets {ω : X n (ω) ≥ α} are not in S m i , then the empirical cumulative distribution of this sequence satisfies
The following result is proved in Appendix A.
Proposition 2.5. If A3, A4 hold for all players, then the following are equivalent:
(1) Assumption A5 holds for Player i.
The next assumption is an interdependent version of Savage's postulate P6, which is usually interpreted as a small event continuity property.
As with P6, this assumption ensures that relevant events are the union of two disjoint relevant events.
Proposition 2.6. If A6 holds, then every E ∈ R i contains two disjoint events in R i .
We next characterize when A5 and A6 hold. The proof of the next proposition is also in Appendix A.
Proposition 2.7. If A3 and A4 hold for all players, then the following are equivalent:
(1) Assumptions A5 and A6 hold for Player i.
Notice that in condition (2) some null events of a player may be given a positive measure. The only requirement is that all events assigned zero measure are null for that player. Since we are dealing with countably additive measures, however, there exists a corresponding measure that is positive on relevant events and zero on all null events.
State-wise agreeing strategies. A strategy f i ∈ F i agrees with a set of strategies
Denote by X i the closure of {f i ∈ F i : f i agrees with X i } in the sequential topology. Functions in X i are said to state-wise agree with X i .
A subset of strategies X i ⊆ F i is said to be countably distinguished if there exists a countable set of states W ⊆ Ω such that for any distinct
A7. For each i there is a set X i ⊆ F i of strategies satisfying the following:
(
(2) X i is countably-distinguished and every sequence in X i has a subsequence converging state-wise to a strategy in X i .
Assumption A7(2) is equivalent to saying that X i is metrizable and compact in the sequential topology. For clarity, we provide some examples of such spaces.
(a) X i is a finite set. 
there is a selection from the equivalence classes of these functions that is compact and metrizable in the sequential topology. (f) Suppose that Ω is a measure space with σ-algebra Σ, and A is a Banach space.
This assumption is satisfied whenever X i is a sequentially compact set of bounded measurable functions for the topology of state-wise convergence, and there is a probability measure π on Σ such that if f i and g i are distinct functions in X i , then they differ on a set of positive π measure. We are now ready to state the main result.
Theorem 2.8. If A1 to A6 hold for all players, then an equilibrium exists if and only if A7 holds.
The proof is in Appendix A but we conclude this section with a brief overview of the line of argument. The proof relies on a fixed point theorem for closed-graphed decomposablevalued correspondences. The idea is a novel notion of monotone purification that allows us to apply a fixed point theorem for absolute retracts. Basically, we take the subset of strategy profiles X given by assumption A7. While X does not admit any continuous ordering, it is compact and metrizable, and thus it is the image of a closed subset C of [0, 1]. We then consider the set of cumulative distributions on C, and show that each of these cumulative distributions maps back to a strategy profile in X. So we transfer the existence of equilibrium problem to a fixed point problem in the space of cumulative distributions on C. By means of A1 and A3 to A6, we transform the best response correspondence into a closed-graphed correspondence on our set of cumulative distributions. A2 guarantees two things. First, that any fixed point of the correspondence on cumulative distributions can be mapped back by a "monotone purification argument" into an equilibrium of the game. Second, it guarantees that the transformed best response correspondence is an acyclic correspondence on an absolute retract, which has a fixed point by the Eilenberg and Montgomery theorem.
Games with recursive payoffs
Our purpose in this section is to study a class of games in which a player's ex ante evaluation of strategy profiles can be expressed as a recursive function of her interim utilities or payoffs. The assumptions that we impose on these games essentially allow for almost arbitrary assessments by a player of other players' strategies. The Savage games associated with these games naturally satisfy assumptions A1 to A6. The games include Bayesian games, games with multiple priors that admit a recursive representation, and more generally games with preferences over interim payoffs satisfying many conditions studied in the literature on decision making under uncertainty. We shall study the specific class of games with multiple priors in the next section.
Consider a game in interim utility form specified as follows: 
is the interim utility for Player i whose type is ω i if she chooses action a i when the other players are choosing their actions according to the strategy profile f −i . For any strategy profile f ∈ F we write
, which we assume is always bounded and Σ i -measurable.
We call a bounded and Σ i -measurable real-valued function α i : Ω i → R an interim payoff for Player i. Player i has ex ante preferences over interim payoffs expressed by the utility function U i that associates with each α i an ex ante utility U i (α i ) in R. The ex ante utility U i (f ) of Player i for the strategy profile f ∈ F is given by means of the recursive form
An equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the normal form game
. Extending the notation of the previous section to interim payoffs we make the following decomposition assumption on preferences over interim payoffs.
B1. If α i , β i are two interim payoffs and U
We also require that ex ante utility over strategy profiles be continuous with respect to an atomless measure.
B2. There exists a probability distribution µ :
(2) If f n is a sequence of strategy profiles that converges µ-almost everywhere to f , then
LetĀ be the disjoint union of the sets A i endowed with a consistent metric for which it is compact. For each
where ≿ i is given byf ≿ iḡ if and only if
Proposition 3.1. If B1 and B2 hold, then the associated Savage game satisfies A1 to A6.
We now explore properties of players' ex ante attitudes towards interim payoffs as embodied in U i , which guarantee that B1 is satisfied. Of course, U i only depends on a Player i's own type, so behaviorally the properties that we discuss are purely decision theoretic embodying the player's attitudes toward non-strategic uncertainty. In this regard, these properties can be compared to the generalizations of expected utility in the literature.
Example 3-1 (Strictly monotone utility) The first property simply requires that players have strictly monotonic preferences over interim payoffs. Some form of monotonicity is present in nearly all generalizations of expected utility. Using the measure from B2, if U i is strictly monotone for the marginal µ i -pointwise ordering of interim payoffs, then B1 holds.
Let µ be the measure from B2. For any interim payoffs write
where α i ∨ β i is the pointwise supremum of the interim payoffs. Thus,
Example 3-2 (Supermodular utilities) In the presence of ambiguity aversion, preferences over interim payoffs need not be strictly monotonic though weak monotonicity can usually be guaranteed (see for example Gilboa (1987) ). However, if U i can be represented by a Choquet integral and exhibits Schmeidler's (1989) notion of uncertainty aversion, then U i will be supermodular (Denneberg, 1994, Corollary 13.4, p. 161) . In fact, weak monotonicity and supermodularity together imply that condition B1 holds. For any interim payoffs α i and β i denote by α i ∨ β i and α i ∧ β i the state-wise supremum and infimum payoffs. Assume that U i is non-decreasing in the sense that if
. Now suppose that U i satisfies supermodularity:
We show that B1 holds. Take α i , β i from that condition and notice that
. From this and the monotinicity of U i we conclude that for any E ∈ Σ i we have
as required. ■ Example 3-3 (Decomposable choice) Moving away from explicit monotonicity, we give a "betweenness" condition on preferences over interim payoffs that generalizes Savage's P2 postulate and that also satisfies the property B1 above. Consider the decomposable choice property of Grant, Kajii, and Polak (2000) , which in this setting requires the following:
GKP: For any interim payoffs α i , β i and events
Recursive payoffs with multiple priors
In this section, we study a class of games in interim utility form
, in which players have multiple priors and interim payoffs satisfying B1 and B2, but not necessarily the conditions in the examples of the previous section. The class includes Bayesian games as a special case.
Player i has a bounded measurable payoff function
where the set of action profiles A is endowed with the product Borel algebra and A × Ω also has the product algebra. Suppose further that for each i, we are given a set D i of probability measures on Σ. For each π i ∈ D i we writeπ i for its marginal distribution on Σ i and for the distribution conditional on own types we write
is a probability distribution on Σ −i interpreted as the conditional probability distribution on ω i ∈ Ω i realizing.
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Assume that the ex ante utilities are of the multiple prior form of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and that D i satisfies the rectangularity property of Epstein and Schneider (2003) :
With this separation we let
We have obtained an associated game in interim utility form and thus a Savage game.
Our first assumption requires that payoffs be continuous in action profiles.
C1. For each ω ∈ Ω, the function a → u i (a, ω) is continuous.
We shall also make the following assumption.
C2. There is a probability measure µ :
The existence of such a conditional distribution is always guaranteed when the underlying probability space is a Radon space. We note that when each Di is a singleton and we are in a Bayesian game setting, the existence of equilibrium result in this section does not require the decomposability of priors into marginals and conditionals. In the next assumption we require that the marginal distributions in D i over Σ i are mutually absolutely continuous. Epstein and Marinacci (2007) characterize this condition for the maxmin expected utility form in terms of a condition of Kreps (1979) . Proposition 4.1 tells us that when C1, C2, and C3 hold, we need only check that A7 holds to apply Theorem 2.8.
C3. The marginal densities {π
i : π i ∈ D i }
Location games with recursive payoffs
We now use this convenient recursive structure to investigate two examples of location games on the sphere. The first is a Bayesian game with payoffs and individual priors that depend on the full profile of types. In the second game, players have multiple priors.
Bayesian location game. Consider the N -player Bayesian game
, where (Ω i , Σ i ), the measurable space of Player i's types, is the unit interval [0, 1]. The action space A i of each player is the unit sphere S n in R n+1 . Player i's prior ν i is a probability density function ν i : Ω → R + , which has full support and is Lipschitz continuous.
Let B n+1 denote the unit ball of R n+1 . The payoff function u i : A × Ω → R of Player i is given by
as Player i's idiosyncratic way of calculating the (generalized) average of the other players' locations, Q i (ω i ) as her most preferred location given her type ω i , and P i (a i , ω i ) as a (possible, but not required) distortion induced by her type ω i on the degree of her desire to be close to the other players' expected location and her own preferred location. In particular, we allow that Player i may be 'social' for some types, for example, P i (a i , ω i ) = a i , but may be 'anti-social' for other types, for example, P i (a i , ω i ) = −a i . We assume that the inverse correspondence P
non-empty valued and Lipschitz continuous with constant K. That is, for all x, y ∈
where δ is the Hausdorff distance between sets in R n+1 . We shall show that this game has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies). Clearly, B1 and B2 hold. By Proposition 3.1 we need only show that A7 is satisfied.
Fix Player i, a strategy profile f −i of other players, and a type ω i ∈ Ω i . For each action a i , let V i (a i , f −i |ω i ) be the interim expected utility
where λ is the Lebesgue probability measure on [0, 1] N −1 and
is the conditional probability density of ν i on Ω −i .
Let
where for any x, y ∈ R n+1 , ⟨x, y⟩ ∈ R is the inner-product. Thus
Noting that
which is the point on the sphere that is farthest away from 
is Lipschitz continuous with some constant K * that is the same for all f −i . By the theorem of Kupka (2005) , this correspondence with one dimensional domain has a K * -Lipschitz continuous selectionf i , which is a best response to f −i . Letting X i be the family of K * -Lipschitz continuous strategies for Player i. By the Arzelà-Ascoli compactness theorem assumption A7 is satisfied.
Location game with multiple-priors. Consider another N -player location game in which once again Player i's type space Ω i is [0, 1] and her action space A i is the unit sphere S n . The player's payoff function
where M i : A −i × Ω → S n is a Lipschitz continuous function. If the type of at least one of the players other than i is less than or equal to one-half, that is Low, then Player i wishes to locate on the circle as far away as possible from M i (a −i , ω), and may get a payoff greater than one. However, if the type of every player aside from i is greater than a half, that is High, then Player i has a guaranteed payoff 1.
We assume the preferences of Player i over strategy profiles take the maxmin expected utility or "multiple priors" form of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) . For each i, let λ i be the Lebesgue distribution on Ω i , and let λ be the product distribution on Ω. LetD i be a weakly compact set of probability density functions on Ω i in which eachν i inD i is mutually absolutely continuous with λ i . Let µ −i : Ω −i × Ω i → R + and ν −i : Ω −i × Ω i → R + be functions for which ω i → µ −i ( · |ω i ) and ω i → ν −i ( · |ω i ) are mappings to conditional probability densities on Ω −i . We assume that for each fixed ω −i the function µ −i is Lipschitz continuous in ω i . We also assume that if ω −i is in the support of µ −i ( · |ω i ), then at least one player is of Low type. We also assume that for each ω i , the support of
Now take D i to be the following set of probability densities defined on Ω:
The ex ante utility of Player i for the strategy profile f ∈ F is
We show that this game has an equilibrium. Since D i satisfies the rectangularity property this is a game in interim form satisfying C1, C2, C3. By Proposition 4.1 we need only show that A7 is satisfied.
Since D i satisfies the rectangularity property it follows if ω i is realized for Player i then the player wants to maximize the interim utility which in this case is given by
For each ω i and f
There is a K that is independent of
Fixing ω i and f −i we notice that for any a i we have ∫
But there is always a point in
In particular, the maximizers of V i have the following form:
for each ω i and f −i . This is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence from [0, 1] to S n . That is, there is a
, where δ is the Hausdorff distance between sets. By the theorem of Kupka (2005) , this correspondence has a K * -Lipschitz continuous selectionf i . Once again applying the Arzelà-Ascoli theorem yields the desired result.
Concluding remarks
We conclude with a discussion of some issues related to the results we have derived in the framework of Savage games.
Universal state space. One question that we do not attempt to answer in this paper is whether it is possible to construct a state space that is a comprehensive representation of the uncertainty faced by players, in the sense of Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) . We note that Epstein and Wang (1996) do provide such foundations for a setting with purely subjective uncertainty and where the preferences of players need not conform to subjective expected utility theory and so may exhibit nonneutral attitudes toward ambiguity. However, Epstein and Wang's setting does not allow for interdependent preferences. Bergemann, Morris, and Takahashi (2011) construct a universal type space for players with interdependent preferences, but as their framework explicitly involves objective randomization, it is not clear to us how their analysis could be conducted in a Savage setting of purely subjective uncertainty. Finally, Di Tillio (2008) allows for more general preferences, albeit in a setting in which there is only a finite number of outcomes.
Rationalizability. It is also not clear to us what is the appropriate notion of rationalizability in the framework of Savage games. There is an extensive literature that provides foundations for equilibrium in terms of rationalizable behavior, see for example Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) in the context of subjective uncertainty, Tan and Werlang (1988) and Börgers (1993) . However, in many of these papers, rationality is expressed in terms of "state-independent expected utility."
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To allow for state-dependent ordinal preferences, an alternative notion of rationalizability is needed. As noted by Morris and Takahashi (2012) , rationalizability defined in terms of ordinal preferences is invariant to the choice of state space, unlike rationalizability defined in terms of expected utility. However, Morris and Takahashi's notion of rationalizability requires explicit randomization of the kind implied by Anscombe-Aumann acts, which is not available in our setting. Epstein (1997) investigates rationalizability in a setting where strategies are analogs of Savage style acts, nevertheless he rules out state-dependent preferences and restricts the analysis to finite normal form games.
Purification of mixed strategies. We have entirely avoided any assumption on the independence or near independence of player information or types or payoffs. Indeed, in our Bayesian game example, types are statistically dependent via arbitrary Lipschitzcontinuous probability density functions. This is in stark contrast with the purification results that follow the classical work of Dvoretzky, Wald, and Wolfowitz (1950) , Radner and Rosenthal (1982) and Milgrom and Weber (1985) , and related literature.
5 One interpretation of this difference is that while decomposability arguments are also at the heart of purification techniques, those require purification of objectively randomized equilibria. The present paper highlights how our use of the decomposition property can be interpreted as purification of a purely subjective kind. 4 An exception is Tan and Werlang (1988) , who start with a Bayesian game in which players have a state-dependent subjective expected utility function.
5 Other results include Balder (1988) , Khan and Sun (1995) , Balder (2002) , Khan, Rath, and Sun An important open question is whether it is possible to obtain our results even for standard Bayesian games with interdependent priors using the purification techniques of the extant literature. That literature has focused on the existence of pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian games in which information is diffuse. The usual approach is to identify conditions on the information structure of the game that allows us to find a profile of pure strategies that is payoff equivalent to any given equilibrium (randomized) strategy profile. To the best of our knowledge, the techniques that have been developed so far rule out interdependent payoffs and require independent distributions of types.
Games with a separable structure. In general, a Savage game cannot be represented as a Bayesian game. This remains the case, even if there exists an associated game in interim utility form that not only satisfies B1 and B2, but the ex ante utilities of the players are additively separable across states. The difficulty stems from the state-dependence of the players' preferences, which prevents a meaningful separation of beliefs from payoffs (see Karni (1985) , Wakker and Zank (1999) , and Debreu (1960) for the single decision maker case). Thus it remains an open question as to when can we meaningfully disentangle preferences from beliefs in a Savage game. We outline one approach as our final remark. Aumann (1974) proposed a class of games with a separable structure to study equilibrium under objective and subjective uncertainty.
6 In this setting, we are able to disentangle subjective beliefs from preferences and thus represent these games as Bayesian games with individual priors. We describe a generalization of the class of games studied by Aumann.
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A game with a separable structure is an N -player game given by the following tuple:
Player i is associated with a set of states, Ω i , and a σ-algebra Σ i of subsets of Ω i . She also has an outcome space O i , which we take to be a metric space. The space
Let Y i denote the set of Player i's acts. Player i has a preference ordering ≿ i on the family of acts Y i . Player i has an action set A i , which is a compact metric space and a measurable outcome function ζ i : A × Ω → O i , which associates action profiles and state profiles with outcomes. An important difference between this framework and that of Aumann (1974) is that Aumann's outcome function is state independent, that is, it is simply a function from A to O i .
A strategy for Player i is a Σ i -measurable function f i : Ω i → A i . Let F i denote the set of Player i's strategies. Each strategy profile f ∈ F is a Σ-measurable function from Ω to A so there is an induced preference relation
The Savage game induced from this game with a separable structure is thus:
Returning to the game with a separable structure, assume now that for each i there is a probability measure 6 Aumann and Dreze (2005) develop a related idea in which subjective risk in a game uses available strategies. See also Section 8 of Hammond (2004) .
7 Incidentally, a by-product of such an extension is that, in addition to the standard Bayesian equilibrium notion, Savage games can also be seen to constitute a suitable framework to investigate the existence of (subjectively) correlated equilibrium.
represents ≿ i over acts for every i. This is the case for example when ≿ i satisfies all of Savage's postulates and the "monotone continuity" assumption of Arrow (1971) that guarantees that π i is countably additive. Setting u i (a, ω) := v i • ζ i (a, ω) and letting
for each f ∈ F we see that U i is a utility representation of ≿ * i . We have thus obtained the N -player Bayesian game 
and
With this, A3 guarantees that the countable union of events is an event. □ Proof of Corollary 2.3. Let σ(F i ) be the smallest σ-algebra of subsets of Ω for which each
Proof of Proposition 2.4. Clearly, the empty set is in
which is a contradiction, because E is null for Player i.
which tells us that E ∪ E ′ ∈ N i . Finally, by A3 and A4, for any increasing sequence of null events E n , the union E is an event, and it must be null for Player i. □ Proof of Proposition 2.5. We can assume without loss of generality that each S m i also has the the property that if E ′ , E ∈ F and
The following hold true: 
There exists a constant c > 0 such that for any finite sequence
This implies that
where χ E is the characteristic function of E. This in turn implies that
for every r k ∈ N, k = 1, . . . , n, satisfying r k > 0 for some k. We conclude that .
is purely finitely additive, for d m > α > 0 there is an increasing sequence E n ∈ F i , ∪ n E n = E, and
But E n ∈ R m i eventually for n large enough. From this we conclude that for such n π
Normalize each π mc i making it a probability measure and consider the probability measure:
That is, π i is the required measure. □ Proof of Proposition 2.6. Suppose that E ∈ R i . For some player j ∈ N , some strategy profile f ∈ F , and some strategy g i ∈ F i we have
Thus, for all k the event E \ E k is in R i . Also, because N i is an ideal there must be some k * such that E k * ∩ E is relevant for Player i. The relevant events E \ E k * and E k * ∩ E are disjoint and their union is E. □ Proof of Proposition 2.7. We need only show that (2) implies (1). Let π i be from condition (2). If π i (Ω) = 0, then we are done, since there are no relevant events. Otherwise, without loss of generality we can assume π i (Ω) = 1. For each m, define the set
This shows that A5 holds.
We show that A6 also holds. Suppose that (g i , f −i ) ̸ ∼ j f . Suppose by way of contradiction that for each m there is E m satisfying π i (E m ) ≤ 1 m such that (h iE m g i , f −i ) ∼ j f . Noting that χ E m converges to zero in π i -measure we can move to a subsequence such that χ E m converges π i -almost surely to zero. But zeros of π i are all null for Player i. Thus, by A4 (g i , f −i ) ∼ j f , which is a contradiction. □ A fixed point theorem. We begin with a statement of a fixed point theorem and apply it to prove Theorem 2.8. For a complete proof of the fixed point theorem used in this subsection, please refer to Meneghel and Tourky (2013) . Let (S, Σ, µ) be an atomless probability space and let T be a topological space. Let L(S, T ) be the set of all functions, not necessarily measurable, from S to T . Endow L(S, T ) with the topology of pointwise convergence.
A set-valued (possibly empty valued) mapping B : F ↠ F is a decomposable mapping if its domain F and values B(f ), for all f ∈ F , are decomposable sets. A decomposable mapping B is µ-sequentially closed graphed if the following hold:
(1) If µ(E) = 0 and g ∈ B(f ), then h E g ∈ B(f ) and g ∈ B(h E f ) for all h ∈ F .
(2) F is sequentially closed in L(S, T ).
(3) B has a sequentially closed graph in F × F . A fixed point of B is a function f ∈ F satisfying f ∈ B(f ).
Theorem A.4 (Corollary 2.3, Meneghel and Tourky (2013) ). Let B : F ↠ F be a decomposable µ-sequentially closed-graphed mapping. If for a compact and metrizable X ⊆ F we have X ∩ B(f ) ̸ = ∅ for each f ∈ F , then B has a fixed point.
Proof of Theorem 2.8. Assume that A7 holds.
For each i let S i = Ω and T i = A. Each f ∈ F is can be considered a function from S to T whereby f (s 1 , . . . , s N ) = (f 1 (s 1 ), . . . , f N (s N )) . For each i consider the atomless measure space (S i , F i , π i ) from Proposition 2.7. We will assume that at least one player has a relevant event and that all non-zero π i are probability measures. Let F = ⊗ N i=1 F i be the tensor product. Each E in F that is not the empty set is of the form (E 1 , E 2 , . . . , E N ) , where E i ∈ F i for each i. Now if f, g ∈ F , then g E f (s 1 , . . . , s N ) = (g 1E 1 f 1 (s 1 ), . . . , g N E N f N (s n )) , which is in F .
Let µ : F → [0, 1] be the probability measure given by
This, is an atomless measure and if µ(E) = 0, then each E i is null for Player i. For each f ∈ F , let B(f ) = {g ∈ F : g i is a best response to f −i for all i} . Notice that if µ(E) = 0 and g ∈ B(f ) we have h E g ∈ B(f ) and g ∈ B(h E f ). Now our sets X i are compact and metrizable in the topology of pointwise convergence. Therefore, their product X ⊆ F is compact and metrizable in the same topology. Assume first that there is only one player. Clearly, an equilibrium exists because the player maximizes her preferences in the compact and metrizable set X. Now suppose that there are two or more players. By assumption A7, the sequentially closed, decomposable set X i is a subset of F i for each i. Let X be the product of X i , which is sequentially closed and decomposable once again. Let B : X → X be the restriction of B to X. We see that B is a decomposable mapping that is also µ-sequentially closed graphed. Applying Theorem A.4 gives us the required equilibrium.
For the converse, if f is an equilibrium, then letting X i = {f i } for each i and noting that because single points in A are closed, we have that X i = X i , A7 holds. □ Proof of Proposition 3.1. Suppose that f ∈ F and g i ∈ F i satisfy
for all E i ∈ Σ i . By B1 this means that
E i ∈ Σ i . Thus, A2 holds. That A3 is satisfied is a consequence of Corollary 2.3. Now U i is continuous for pointwise convergent sequences of strategy profiles by B2. So A4 holds.
If A has less than two points, then all events are null and A5 and A6 hold trivially. If they have two or more points, then by Corollary 2.3Σ i = F i . Now the restriction of µ i tō Σ i is atomless and if µ(E) = 0, then E is null for Player i by (2) 
We see that
Thus, it must be the case that α i and α i ∨ β i agree µ * i -almost surely. Similarly, β i and α i ∨ β i agree µ * i -almost surely. This implies that α i and β i agree almost surely for all µ i ∈ D i . This implies that U i (β iE α i ) = U i (α i ) for all E i ∈ Σ i , as required. □
